COVID-19 Contact Tracing: Privacy-Preserving Integration Architectures for Public Health Surveillance
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.63282/3050-9416.IJAIBDCMS-V2I1P109Keywords:
COVID-19, digital contact tracing, privacy-preserving algorithms, public health surveillance, decentralized architecture, federated learning, secure multiparty computation, differential privacy, exposure notification, health data integration, population-scale systems, epidemiological intelligence, real-time analytics, cryptographic proximity tracing, GDPR compliance, HIPAA compliance, data governance, mobile health (mHealth), outbreak containment, digital epidemiologyAbstract
The COVID-19 pandemic catalysed the global deployment of digital contact tracing systems to manage disease spread efficiently and rapidly. While these systems offered unprecedented capabilities for population-scale monitoring and exposure notification, they also raised significant concerns about data privacy, individual autonomy, and government surveillance overreach. As a result, the fundamental challenge in deploying such systems lies in achieving a balance between effective epidemiological surveillance and the preservation of individual privacy. This paper addresses this critical duality by proposing a privacy-preserving integration architecture explicitly tailored for large-scale public health surveillance through contact tracing. The architecture integrates cutting-edge cryptographic methods, federated analytics, and scalable edge-cloud orchestration to ensure both data minimization and real-time operational readiness across diverse health jurisdictions. At the core of the proposed architecture is a decentralized contact tracing model that leverages Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)-based proximity detection and the broadcasting of ephemeral identifiers, thereby avoiding the collection of location data and the centralized storage of personally identifiable information (PII). Privacy-preserving technologies such as homomorphic encryption, secure multiparty computation (SMPC), and differential privacy are employed to enable encrypted data analysis and aggregate risk modeling without exposing raw data. The architecture supports edge devices (mobile phones) as primary data processors. It uses federated learning models to enable local model training on contact event data, subsequently aggregating anonymized insights to a central public health node without transferring raw contact histories.
To ensure interoperability with national public health surveillance systems and policy mandates, the architecture includes modular APIs for real-time integration with epidemiological dashboards, case management systems, and digital health certificates. A data governance layer embedded in the design ensures access control, audit trails, and compliance with international data protection frameworks, including the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Additionally, a multi-tiered alerting and notification subsystem disseminates risk-based guidance to users and public health officials, supporting timely intervention while safeguarding personal privacy. Through simulation of contact tracing scenarios involving over 10 million synthetic users, the proposed architecture demonstrated a 60% reduction in privacy re-identification risk and a 45% improvement in processing scalability compared to centralized models. Furthermore, the policy alignment module enabled seamless integration with public health strategies in multi-agency settings, enhancing decision-making speed and data reliability. The system was evaluated against contemporary deployments, including Google/Apple Exposure Notification (GAEN), BlueTrace, and DP-3T, with comparative analysis highlighting improvements in auditability, decentralization, and regulatory compliance. This paper contributes to the evolving discourse on digital health by presenting a technical blueprint for ethically responsible, privacy-preserving public health surveillance. The architecture serves as a foundation for future deployments of disease detection and outbreak containment systems that must operate at scale without sacrificing user trust. As global health threats persist, the findings of this study support a paradigm shift toward decentralized, secure, and policy-aware digital epidemiology infrastructures that can address both current and emerging challenges in public health data integration
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